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ABSTRACT: This article introduces the concept of organizational
ambidexterity and explains its value to military planning and
problem-solving from the tactical to strategic levels.

I

n 2005, as the US military waged numerous armed conflicts around
the world, Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker was
confronted with a serious troop shortage. In an interview with Time,
he explained not only how he would overcome the shortage but also
why there was no need to institute a draft: “We are developing a modular
Army force that gives us much more rapidly deployable, much more
capable organizations. . . . What you will have is a team of pentathletes.
I want a whole team of Michael Jordans who can play any position. We
must . . . have this pentathlete team better organized, better led, better
trained, better equipped, and more strategically agile.”1
It is not a stretch of imagination to anticipate future troop shortages,
especially for an all-volunteer Army required to sustain numerous small
wars across several regions of the world simultaneously. Thus, the concept
of the pentathlete soldier—multifaceted and agile, proficient in a broad
range of tasks, and capable of accomplishing a variety of missions—is
key to sustaining Schoomaker’s vision of flexible, multifunctional Army
units that effectively operate in complex environments.
While US Army strategists were devising more efficient and effective
ways to train and employ soldiers to meet this vision, Joseph Soeters,
then-dean of management studies at the Netherlands Defense Academy,
was exploring organizational ambidexterity.2 Arguably, he identified and
extended the philosophy of pragmatism practiced by Morris Janowitz,
a pioneer of military sociology, to examine the changing nature of Cold
War and post-Cold War civil-military relations.3 The passage below
introduces Soeter’s perspective:
Peace operations are often mixed military and civilian and led by military
forces, which bring a warrior ethos to the task. The warrior ethos includes
rigid dichotomies such as friend/enemy, victory/defeat, strength/
weakness, good/evil, and life/death. The seeming contradiction of
1      Sally B. Donnelly and Douglas Waller, “Ten Questions with Peter Schoomaker,” Time, April
22, 2005. Later in the interview Schoomaker was asked if America needed a draft. His answer:
“No . . . because it takes too long to train people as pentathletes.”
2      Soeters won the Morris Janowitz Career Achievement Award for excellence in the study of
armed forces and society. For more information on this award, see “The Morris Janowitz Career
Achievement Award,” Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, http://www.iusafs
.org/JanowitzAward.asp (accessed April 21, 2017).
3      Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971),
264–77, 303–20. Also see Donald S. Travis, “Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic
Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society, August 30, 2016, doi:10.1177/0095327X16667287.
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warriors administering peace poses challenges for the administration of
a positive peace.4

Soeter’s pragmatic approach to ambidexterity, which implies
something exceptional such as a soccer player’s skillful use of both feet,
can impact warfighting and peacekeeping in many ways. This versatility
can address seemingly contradictory goals imbedded in international
peacekeeping operations that often employ military skill sets concurrently
to carry out other operations. As a pragmatic approach, ambidexterity
recognizes a problematic situation facing leaders of such missions and
suggests a strategy to resolve the problem. The approach deals with the
time-honored culture of the warrior and the need to adapt in the face of
new or evolving missions. The concept also represents an adaptable and
useful cross-disciplinary practice of excelling at seemingly contradictory
skills that is applicable in medicine, business, and many organizations,
including those involved in military affairs. This article addresses each
of these applications and explains several implications of pragmatism
and ambidexterity for the military environment.

Ambidexterity

In 1997 Michael L. Tushman, a leading organizational behavior
theorist from the Harvard Business School, along with his associates
Philip Anderson and Charles A. O’Reilly examined the problem of
ensuring ongoing organizational innovation. They identified two types
of innovation—incremental and discontinuous. Incremental innovations
occur during routine business activities. Discontinuous innovations
are needed to prepare for fundamental changes in technology or the
market. Notably, the team determined “ambidextrous organizations
have multiple organizational architectures to concurrently nurture these
diverse innovation requirements.”5
O’Reilly and Tushman subsequently brought widespread recognition
to the concept of ambidexterity after examining the challenges
of attending to routine matters or exploiting the current business
environment while also exploring opportunities to ensure future
success. Considering how managers maintain stability and prepare for
inevitable changes, they noted the difficulty of attending to exploitation
and exploration simultaneously. Typically, a manager’s attention focuses
on pressing daily activities, which leaves little time for contemplating
future promises and pitfalls.6 This widespread management conundrum
is endemic to the military.
The friction between current operations and the need to improve
capabilities can result in organizations being ill-prepared for the
future; ambidexterity is a way to resolve this competition. Successful
organizations meet this challenge by placing these functions in
4      Patricia M. Shields and Joseph L. Soeters, “Peaceweaving: Jane Addams, Positive Peace,
and Public Administration,” American Review of Public Administration 47, no. 3 (April 2017): 325,
doi:10.1177/0275074015589629.
5      Michael L. Tushman, Philip Anderson, and Charles A. O’Reilly, “Technology Cycles,
Innovation Streams and Ambidextrous Organizations,” in Managing Strategic Innovation and Change: A
Collection of Readings, ed. Michael L. Tushman and Philip Anderson (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997), 6.
6      Charles A. O’Reilly and Michael L. Tushman, “The Ambidextrous Organization,” Harvard
Business Review 82 (April 2004): 74–81.
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separate divisions that report to a single supervisor—these firms are
ambidextrous.7 Ambidexterity is a way for military leaders to cope
with contradictory demands when carrying out missions that rely
upon cooperation and collaboration with joint forces and nonmilitary
organizations. This represents an example of a pragmatic organizational
culture that can improve organizational effectiveness.8 The pragmatic
approach will be discussed further.

Military Operations and Ambidexterity

The concept of ambidexterity is applied to contemporary military
organizations by examining seemingly intractable dualisms. Take, for
example, a pair of concepts known as bonding and bridging. By drawing
on a common experiential reference, such as traveling, the relevance of
these concepts can be explained for postmodern military operations.
If a person is traveling in a group, interactions establish friendships
and reinforce strong ties—bonding occurs within the community. On
the other hand, if a person is traveling alone, efforts focus on bridging
language and cultural differences to develop acquaintances that can
help the traveler successfully navigate the journey.9 Thus, bonding and
bridging are viewed as a mutually exclusive, fixed dichotomy.10
As a feature of ambidexterity, bonding and bridging can occur
simultaneously: unit cohesion is built while coordinating and
collaborating with other units or organizations.11 Bonding “implies that
servicemen do not want to have anything to do with people outside
their own unit.”12 This is logical when enemies are clearly defined and
understood, but can be problematic in the presence of ambiguity during
complex operations. Further, traditional combat units take orders and
respond in predictable ways; they are not supposed to demonstrate
innovative ideas. Likewise, groups formed with strong ties generally
have “limited cognitive flexibility” and are “less receptive to innovative
ideas.”13 These fundamentals of ambidexterity explain why units must
develop the ability to learn and adapt, especially during complex
multinational operations.
Nevertheless, cohesion is not as essential during a crisis situation
absent a clear friend-and-foe relationship. In these instances, the ability
to bridge—collaborate with other civilian and military organizations—
becomes a necessity.14 This need, however, does not reduce the importance
of internal military cohesion: “Bonding and bridging are required
during multinational non-Article 5 crisis-response operations. . . . Under
those circumstances, the pattern of bonding without bridging clearly
7      Ibid.
8      Joseph L. Soeters, “Ambidextrous Military: Coping with Contradictions of New Security
Policies,” in The Viability of Human Security, ed. Monica den Boer and Jaap de Wilde (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 109–124.
9      Ibid.
10      Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6
(May 1973): 1360–80; and Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory
Revisited,” Sociological Theory 1 (1983): 201–33.
11      Guy L. Siebold, “Key Questions and Challenges to the Standard Model of Military Group
Cohesion,” Armed Forces & Society 37, no. 3 (July 2011): 448–68, doi:10.1177/0095327X11398451.
12      Soeters, “Ambidextrous Military,” 115.
13      Ibid., 113.
14      Ibid., 115.
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does not work as well.”15 So, there is an inherent contradiction: bonding
and bridging appear to be more or less mutually exclusive, yet groups
and people strongly gravitate toward one connection or the other.
Military organizations dealing with diverse cultures in the uncertain
postmodern environment need to be able to do both. Soeters interprets
recent literature to suggest bonding and bridging can be compatible by
applying the concept of ambidexterity.16
Similar to the soccer player who learns to develop a weak leg,
organizations can learn to deal with the contradictory demands of
bridging and bonding required for joint force operations.17 One technique
to accomplish this proficiency involves structural ambidexterity, which
would involve assigning units varied but distinct roles and missions such
that one unit might orient more on bonding and focus on “war-fighting,
terrorist hunting and other activities that imply the use of violence.”18
Tasks for another unit might involve bridging and focus on peacekeeping,
civil-military cooperation, humanitarian relief, and nation-building.19 In
this manner, military organizations develop the operational capacity to
respond to a variety of contexts quickly and effectively.
An additional approach is contextual ambidexterity where
commanders would develop both bonding and bridging skills to
strengthen relationships with other policymakers and joint force leaders.
As Soeters explains, leaders “need to have a broad view of their work,
being culturally intelligent as well as being alert to opportunities and
challenges beyond the confines of their jobs. They need to act like
brokers, always looking to build internal and external linkages, and if
needed they have to be comfortable wearing more than one ‘hat.’ Most
of all they need to be able to immediately switch from communicating
and negotiating to the actual repelling and use of violence.”20
Ambidexterity also applies to the challenge of defining and achieving
peace—negative peace as the absence of violence and positive peace as the
incorporation of social justice and equality.21 Functioning societies work
to achieve a positive peace knowing it is perhaps an impermanent goal
requiring diligence. To move a society from the sphere of negative peace
to positive peace during turbulent transitions such as those accompanying
peacekeeping operations, soldiers need to use ways of thinking and skills
that are seemingly contradictory. In the pragmatic sense, ambidexterity
helps a soldier to reconcile some of the contradictions, such as the need
15      Ibid.
16      O’Reilly and Tushman, “Ambidextrous Organization.”
17      Soeters, “Ambidextrous Military,” 120.
18      Ibid., 121.
19      Thomas P. M. Barnett recognized the dual role of military forces and called for organizing
them into two functions or types of units: the leviathan specializing in “high-tech big violence
war” and the system administrator specializing in “low-tech security generation and routine crisis
response.” Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 299–302.
20      Soeters, “Ambidextrous Military,” 122. This kind of challenge was recognized by the US
Marines and codified in General Charles C. Krulak’s article “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership
in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine, January 1999. Also see US Marine Corps Combat
Development Command (MCCDC), A Concept for Future Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain
(Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 1997).
21      Shields & Soeters, “Peaceweaving”; and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Jonas Nordkvelle and Håvard
Strand, “Peace Research—Just the Study of War?,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (March 2014):
145–58, doi:10.1177/0022343313514074.
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to be a shooter and a talker that is associated with the uneven process of
moving from negative to positive peace.22
It is not enough to simply recognize the dualisms fraught in warfare.
Ambidexterity addresses dichotomies that appear to confound both
theory and practice: it can clarify the fog and friction of bureaucratic
inertia. When applied to military operations, pragmatism orients
thinking to improve national security practitioners’ thinking. It can
also affect approaches for achieving peace and stability while striving to
maintain our humanity.

Pragmatism Underlying Ambidexterity

Pragmatism, a philosophy of common sense born in the United
States soon after the Civil War, was a response to dogmatic thinking that
propelled the bloody conflict.23 Using purposeful human inquiry as a
focal point, pragmatism represents a continual process of discovery and
doubt that acknowledges the qualitative nature of human experience
as problematic situations emerge and are recognized.24 Pragmatism
embraces doubt and uncertainty and focuses attention on practical
effects.25 Janowitz employed it to challenge military problems.
The uncertainties of warfare are so great that the most elaborate peacetime
planning and the most realistic exercises are at best weak indicators of
emerging imponderables. Dogmatic doctrine is a typical organizational
reflex reaction to future uncertainties . . . The constabulary concept provides
a continuity with past military experiences and traditions, but also offers a
basis for the radical adaptation of the profession. The military establishment
becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act,
committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international
relations, rather than victory . . . The constabulary outlook is ground in, and
extends pragmatic doctrine.”26

Pragmatists such as Janowitz approach challenges with a spirit of
inquiry, critical optimism, and cooperation by using an experimental
logic—or purposeful human inquiry grounded in a problematic
situation.27 Problems are situated in experience and culture; problematic
situations often challenge existing belief systems and ways of doing things.
Accounting for the qualitative nature of human experience, the uneasy,
doubtful feeling preceding problem recognition and the problematic
situation are recognized and reconciled through the transformations of
inquiry, which involve “critical reasoning, empirical investigation and
actions that are assessed in light of practical consequences.”28

22      Shields and Soeters, “Peaceweaving.”
23      Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: The Story of Ideas in America (New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 2001).
24      Patricia M. Shields, “Using Pragmatism to Bridge the Gap between Academe and Practice”
(presentation, Conference of the American Society for Public Administration, Denver, CO, April
1–4, 2006), 7, https://digital.library.txstate.edu/handle/10877/3955.
25      Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” Popular Science Monthly 12 (November 1877):
1–15; and Charles Sanders Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Popular Science Monthly 12 (January
1878): 286–302.
26      Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 24, 418.
27      John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt, 1938).
28      Patricia M. Shields, “Rediscovering the Taproot: Is Classical Pragmatism the Route to
Renew Public Administration,” Public Administration Review 68, no. 2 (March/April 2008): 206,
doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00856.x.
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Inquiry reduces uncertainty, facilitates the next steps, and links
the problematic situation to an end-in-view—a flexible, practical goal
with meaning in the real world that cannot be separated from human
experience. With a goal of continually adapting plans based upon
practicality, a “social component” generally accompanies the curiosity
of this approach, which helps the decision-maker expand information
on a topic of interest through community input.29 Thus, pragmatism
approaches all problematic situations with a spirit of critical optimism—
“the belief that the specific conditions which exist at one moment, be
they comparatively bad or comparatively good, in any event may be
bettered.”30 Critical optimism recognizes evil yet never becomes stuck
in the paralysis of pessimism.31
As forerunners to Janowitz, John Dewey and Jane Addams
pioneered a sophisticated theory of participatory democracy where a
diverse community is involved in shaping or characterizing a problematic
situation, developing approaches to resolve the problem, defining and
refining the end-in-view, and potentially, being transformed in the
process. Their pragmatic vision is embraced by Janowitz in his book
The Professional Soldier, where the constabulary concept depends on
cooperation, collaboration, and critical optimism. Whether any Army
can build and sustain a cadre of pentathletes will impact military planning
from the tactical to grand-strategic levels. Developing valid assumptions
and feasible objectives, which is the primary building blocks of any plan,
could benefit from practical inquiry, critical optimism, and cooperation.

Resolving Dualisms

Resolving two seemingly intractable dualisms central to many
human problematic situations can help postmodern militaries develop
ambidexterity. Psycho-philosophical dualisms deal with the separation
of mind and body and incorporate dichotomies such as theory/practice
and thought/action. Moral dualisms take into account notions of good
and evil such as friend/enemy and oppressed/oppressor. Rigid moral
dualisms mentioned in this section can also be an ongoing impetus
to violent conflict.

Psycho-Philosophical

Dewey’s perspective on psycho-philosophical dichotomy arose from
his organic and holistic model of experience.32 He criticized the reflex
arc, a model that reduces behavior to discrete and separate stimulus and
response observed in situations similar to a child quickly withdrawing
(response) his or her hand from a flame (stimulus). Dewey disagreed with
the model’s artificial detachment of sensory stimulus, central response,
and action into discrete components. He also declared the reflex arc
misrepresents how people interact with their environs, explaining how
organisms do not “passively receive a stimulus and then become active

29      Ibid.
30      John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press 1957), 179.
31      
Patricia M. Shields, “The Community of Inquiry: Classical Pragmatism and Public
Administration,” Administration & Society 35, no. 5 (2003): 510–38, doi:10.1177/0095399703256160.
32      David L. Hildebrand, Dewey: A Beginners Guide (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), 12.

Innovations in Warfare & Strategy

Shields and Travis

71

responders.”33 Concluding organisms interact continuously with their
environment in a cumulative and mutually modifying manner, Dewey
argued the arc too rigidly identifies a clear starting and ending point
when “both stimulus and response are enmeshed in an ongoing matrix
of sensory and motor activities. A stimulus comes from somewhere and
a response leads elsewhere—to further coordination and integration of
both sensory and motor responses.”34
Importantly, stimulus and response occur “in a wider dynamic
context” (culture) that incorporates aims and interests as well as “an
environment, which contains the problems and surprises that spur
us on to grow.”35 Dewey suggested an alternative coordinated circuit
illustrating dichotomies similar to stimulus and response that cloaks
“ancient psychophysical dualisms” such as mind/body, thought/action,
ends/means, and theory/practice.36
These common dualisms are rooted in an erroneous and radical
separation of the perceiver from the world: “Dewey’s model rejects this
inner/outer model from the start. His is an ecological model—mind,
body and world are mutually created by their ongoing interaction.”37
Dewey’s model focuses on relationships: instead of viewing stimulus
and response as discrete disconnected components, he shows their
relationship within a larger environment. Soeters applies this concept
to the relation of culture to human interaction and shows how bonding
and bridging can be applied to complicated, multinational, postmodern
military missions.38

Moral Dualisms

As mentioned earlier, pragmatism was partly a reaction to rigid
moral positions that propelled the US Civil War—for example, Southern
honor was tied to a devotion to the slave system. To threaten slavery
threatened honor, which justified and compelled a violent response.39
Jane Addams, another pioneer of pragmatism and a philosopher of
peace, clearly articulated problems with rigid moral perspectives. She
reacted to the moral paternalism that bound women to the home and
excluded them from the public sphere.40 Notably, such rigid moralisms
contain implicit dualisms because for each right there is a contrasting
wrong; each enemy has corresponding friends. Addams posits “life itself
teaches us nothing more inevitable than that right and wrong are most
confusedly mixed: That the blackest wrong is by our side and within
our own motives; that right does not dazzle our eyes with its radiant
shining, but has to be found by exerting patience, discrimination and

33      John Dewey, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” Psychological Review 3, no. 4 (July
1896): 359.
34      Hildebrand, Dewey, 15–16.
35      Ibid.
36      Dewey, “Reflex Arc”; and Hildebrand, Dewey, 16–17.
37      Hildebrand, Dewey, 21.
38      Soeters, “Ambidextrous Military.”
39      Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982).
40      Patricia M. Shields, “Democracy and the Social Feminist Ethics of Jane Addams: A Vision
for Public Administration,” Administrative Theory and Praxis 28, no. 3 (September 2006): 418–43.
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impartiality.”41 In this manner, rigid moral perspectives carry the weight
of moral superiority with little room for human frailty or weakness. As a
result, the concerns of the weak and dispossessed can be marginalized,
offering the seeds of terrorism.42

Sympathy as Remedy

As an alternative to inflexible moral certainty, Addams offered
sympathetic knowledge explained as a willingness to suspend judgment,
listen, “see the size of one another’s burden,” and “a determination
to enter into lives that [are] not one’s own, without falling into the
arrogant pretense that one [understand] the lives of others better than
they [do].”43 Addams believed “when we sympathetically and affectively
understand the plight of others, we are more likely to care and act in
their behalf.”44 Armed with this perspective, leaders can incorporate
emotions into their sense of knowledge to bring emotional kindness
and imagination to interpersonal encounters.45 By applying this practice
to the intractable, opposing moral narratives, such as friend/enemy,
oppressed/oppressor, capitalism/communism, and Muslim/Christian,
that are inevitably present in violent conflict, postmodern militaries can
contribute to the puzzle of ending violence.46

Soeters’s Pragmatism

Soeters recognized reciprocal stereotyping between groups who
believe opposing poles of moral dualisms resulted in the groups assigning
greater values to self-associated qualities and increasing requirements
on those with opposing views, which is a “self-propelling process of
ideological escalation” referred to as ethnic outbidding.47 This concept
arose from Soeters’s search for a “coherent set of thematic concerns and
common logic of inquiry” consistent with philosophical pragmatism
that can be traced from Dewey to Janowitz.48 Samuel P. Huntington
focused on this separation between civilian and military groups and the
paradoxes that emerge from that detachment.49
One notion, which acknowledged the separation but accentuated
the societal interpenetration and societal context of the civil-military
environment, veered away from absolutism.50 The pragmatic analysis
41      Jane Addams, “The Settlement as a Factor in the Labor Movement,” in Hull House Maps
and Papers: A Presentation of Nationalities and Wages in a Congested District of Chicago (New York: T. Y.
Crowell, 1895), 199.
42      Jean B. Elshtain, Jane Addams and the Dream of American Democracy (New York: Basic Books,
2002).
43      Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1902), 6; and Elshtain, Jane
Addams and the Dream of American Democracy, 122.
44      Maurice Hamington, The Social Philosophy of Jane Addams (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
2009), 74.
45      Patricia M. Shields, “Jane Addams: Peace Activist and Peace Theorist” in Jane Addams
Progressive Pioneer of Peace Philosophy, Sociology, Social Work and Public Administration, ed. Patricia M.
Shields (New York: Springer, 2017), 31–42.
46      Joseph L. Soeters, Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics of Civil Wars (London:
Routledge, 2005).
47      Ibid., 84.
48      James Burk, “Introduction: A Pragmatic Sociology,” in On Social Organization and Social
Control, by Morris Janowitz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1, 3.
49      Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).
50      Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 264–77.
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of military and society leading to this concept ended during the Cold
War, but not before bearing the notion of constabulary force, which
is visible in peacekeeping operations.51 Recent scholarship likewise
emphasizes “inflexible or absolutist doctrine can no longer effectively
address the needs of people in turmoil. A flexible or pragmatic approach
to peacekeeping, on the other hand, offers a way to achieve this critically
important end-in-view.”52

Dualisms

Recognizing the civilian/military dualism overlaying the study of
military affairs, Soeters explored multinational peacekeeping operations,
where the inherent contradictions and tensions are not only a ripe
source for research but also predisposed to deeper implications. Such
peacekeeping operations exist at all levels of war and during all phases
of military operations, and Soeters discovered a way that pragmatism
as a way of thinking could help achieve better results. He came to
understand the methods armies use to defeat enemies and to set the
conditions for peace is a reflection of the values inherent in the societies
they serve, through research involving interpreters, strategic flexibility,
demobilization and transition of soldiers, and operational planning
in Afghanistan.
In a mechanical sense, interpreters, such as those who conducted
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan, are tools to
translate words across different languages. Familiar military slang—
translations machines—captures this role and the active/passive
dualism perfectly: the military officer actively communicates with
host nationals, the interpreter passively relays the words.53But Soeters’s
research on translators challenges this metaphor. Harkening back to
Dewey’s criticism of the reflex arc isolating stimulus-response events, a
more organic model of experience developed in which interpreters and
others engaged in negotiations by continuously interacting with their
environment were integrated in a cumulative and mutually modifying
way to prevent strategic faux pas.54
Because something as basic as interpretation could significantly
impact peacekeeping operations, the resolution of the dualism of close/
distant relationships between local interpreters and their military units
must be achieved. Military leaders must facilitate effective communication
in these situations by building cohesion within the team as well as
supporting the ability of the unit’s interpreters to assimilate messages
to cultural differences. The interpreters must likewise accommodate
characteristics of other groups, such as the Dutch military’s direct
51      Travis, “Saving Samuel Huntington,” 2, 5, 7.
52      Patricia M. Shields and Joseph L. Soeters, “Pragmatism, Peacekeeping, and the Constabulary
Force,” in Philosophical Pragmatism and International Relations: Essays for a Bold New World, ed. Shane
Ralston (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), 105.
53      Geesje Bos and Joseph L. Soeters, “Interpreters at Work: Experiences from Dutch and Belgian
Peace Operations,” International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2 (2006): 264, doi:10.1080/13533310500437662.
54      Bos and Soeters, “Interpreters at Work”; Andrea van Dijk, Joseph L. Soeters, and Richard
de Ridder, “Smooth Translation? A Research Note on the Cooperation between Dutch Service
Personnel and Local Interpreters in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces & Society 36, no. 5 (2010): 917–25,
doi:10.1177/0095327X10379732; and Iris Hoedemaekers and Joseph L. Soeters, “Interaction
Rituals and Language Mediation during Peace Missions: Experiences from Afghanistan,” in Advances
in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (Bingley, UK: Emerald
Group Publishing, 2009), 329–52, doi:10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)000012A024.
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communication style and the Afghan military’s less explicit and more
ambiguous style, to build trust among joint forces. Addressing this
dualism simultaneously resolves the tension from the trust/distrust
dualism interpreters experience when their interpretations are relied
upon, but they are excluded from other activities.55
The dualism of large, mechanized forces/small, expeditionary
units associated with Western militaries’ transition from defending a
relatively ordered world to responding to regional instability crises also
vexes military leaders. Given the nature of organizational flexibility and
the ways military organizations could adapt, a problematic paradox of
duality is identified: too much flexibility causes chaos and too much
rigidity prohibits adaptation.56 Organizations often face a power struggle
between stability and change, but organizational sensing enhances
functional flexibility.
A case study involving the Netherlands’ armed forces found “within
highly turbulent crisis response missions, organizational sensing becomes
the predominant driver, stimulating ad hoc solutions that challenge
existing structures, available technology and standard procedures.”57
This observation certainly resonates with insights from pragmatic
inquiry much like the research on demobilizing and integrating Eritrean
fighters into civil service rolls identified a dualism of fighter/nonfighter.58
The ambidexterity displayed during this transition can also be applied:
“Military leaders should be ready for action, violent action if need be.
At the same time they are requested to hold their fire when they operate
in peacekeeping missions in which talking to people is more important
than shooting.”59
Other research on an effects-based approach to operations identified
seemingly contradictory intuition driven/assessment driven approaches
to leadership as an implementation challenge to the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan.60 Although the researchers’ metaphor
described the culture of the mind as software and the organization (or
body) as hardware, Soeters provided a perfect rejection of the psychophilosophical dualism: “The implicit body versus mind analysis doesn’t
work out because culture comprises body, soul and mind.”61
When contemplating the source of violent ethnic conflicts, Soeters
notes “there is no simple emotional or rational understanding of the
55      Bos and Soeters, “Interpreters at Work,” 266.
56      Erik de Waard, Henk W. Volberda, and Joseph L. Soeters, “Engaging Environmental
Turbulence: Drivers of Organizational Flexibility in the Armed Forces,” European Security 22, no. 4
(2013): 579, doi:10.1080/09662839.2013.822367.
57      Ibid., 577.
58      Mussie T. Tessema and Joseph L. Soeters, “Practices and Challenges of Converting Former
Fighters into Civil Servants: The Case of Eritrea,” Public Administration and Development 26, no.4
(2006): 359–71, doi:10.1002/pad.402.
59      Erik de Waard, E and Joseph L. Soeters, “How the Military Can Profit from Management
and Organization Science,” in Social Sciences and the Military: An Interdisciplinary Overview, ed. Giuseppe
Caforio (New York: Routledge, 2007), 191.
60      Sebastiaan Rietjens, Joseph L. Soeters, and Willem Klumper, “Measuring the Immeasurable?
The Effects-Based Approach in Comprehensive Peace Operations,” International Journal of Public
Administration 34, no. 5 (2011): 329–38, doi:10.1080/01900692.2011.557816.
61      Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov, Cultures and Organizations: Software
of the Mind (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005); and Urlich vom Hagen, René Moelker, and Joseph L.
Soeters, “Introduction: Cultural Interoperability” in Cultural Interoperability: Ten Years of Research into
Co-operation in the First German-Netherlands Corps, ed. Ulrich vom Hagen, René Moelker, and Joseph L.
Soeters (Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 2006), 7.
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incredible events taking place around the world.”62 He delves into
dichotomies such as micro/macro factors, grid/group, us/them, tough/
soft, male/female cultures, economic growth/environment, collectivism/
individualism, victim/perpetrator, and identification/disidentification.
These dichotomies provide frameworks for useful analytical distinctions
and illustrative examples. These and other dualisms depict cultural
rigidities that contribute to violence.
The American Civil War sheds an example of the problems with
moral dualisms associated with rigid belief systems where unwavering
cultural conceptions of honor can contribute to violence. Offended
by events that could be trifling or profound, people retaliate against
perpetrators for revenge or as an effort to restore others’ perceptions
of a valuable self-associated characteristic.63 A contrasting approach
to influence others’ perceptions during dysfunctional conflicts applies
sympathetic knowledge or empathy to “cement” relationships, which can
also enhance cooperation and promote peacekeeping.64 Dutch Muslim
servicemen are particularly effective working with host nationals because
of their ability “to approach the local population in an empathetic and
trustworthy manner.”65

Conclusion

Soeters first employed the tenets of classical pragmatism to analyze
peacekeeping operations during the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). By
studying the strained relationships among the peacekeepers and the
populace, in the context of institutional theory related to gaining public
acceptance and legitimacy, Soeters found the four P’s of pragmatism—
practical, pluralism, participatory, and provisional—particularly
useful to identifying “the sore spots of MONUC’s reputation and
legitimacy.”66 Such an approach can be useful to examine the second
Iraq war. Beginning with the December 2003 troop rotation, combat,
stability, and enabling civil authority operations were intermingled,
forcing Commanders and soldiers to step outside of their comfort zones.
Artillery batteries performed military police duties. Armor companies
became scouts and infantryman. Transportation units fought running
battles along main supply routes, and nearly every soldier assumed advise
and assist roles to support the fledgling Iraqi military. When developing
war plans, going in with an Army of pentathletes might be better than

62      Soeters, Ethnic Conflict, vii.
63      Ibid., 63.
64      René Moelker, Joseph L. Soeters, and Urlich vom Hagen, “Sympathy, the Cement of
Interoperability,” Armed Forces & Society 33, no. 4 (July 2007): 496–517
65      Femke Bosman, Joseph L. Soeters, and Fatima Ait Bari, “Dutch Muslim Soldiers during Peace Operations in Muslim Societies,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 5 (2008): 695–705,
doi:10.1080/13533310802396376.
66      Ingrid van Osch and Joseph L. Soeters, “Fragile Support: MONUC’s Reputation and
Legitimacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” in Mission Critical: Smaller Democracies’ Role in
Global Stability Operations, ed. Christian Leuprecht, Jodok Troy, and David Last (London: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2010), 78, 79; and David Brendel, Healing Psychiatry: Bridging the Science/
Humanism Divide (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).
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creating pentathletes ad hoc.67 This type of force would add needed
flexibility and resilience.
Thus, Soeters’ approach represents a fusion of European
perspectives with American pragmatism that can be helpful for today’s
American military thinkers who dichotomize military challenges.
In the spirit of Janowitz, Soeter’s willingness to embrace uncertainty
illustrates his understanding of the provisional nature of not only social
science scholarship but also of the real world, where theory can be
tested to optimize organizational effectiveness.68 The practical problems
associated with managing and leading military organizations calls leaders
to recognize and work with inherent contradictions and to develop
ambidexterity within the force structure.69 Through inquiry, critical
optimism, cooperation, and sympathetic knowledge, commanders,
their staffs, and the soldiers they lead, as pentathletes, can more fully
understand the operational environment, identify valid assumptions and
appropriate objectives, and develop strategies and plans to optimize the
effectiveness of military operations in complex environments.
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